Desire

Desire

Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action

eBook - 1995
Rate this:
MIT Press

Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debatedtopic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" aredistinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations ofaction in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken.


Does action always arise out of desire? G.F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished -- roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes -- apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken.

Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G.F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual belief-desire accounts need to be replaced.

Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper. Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all.

A Bradford Book



Book News
At least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in explaining intentional action. The author argues that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include proper desires at all but instead "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states. Annotation copyright Book News, Inc. Portland, Or.

Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©1995
ISBN: 9780585020464
0585020469
9780262193559
0262193558
0262193558
Characteristics: 1 online resource (xi, 223 pages)

Opinion

From the critics


Community Activity

Comment

Add a Comment

There are no comments for this title yet.

Age Suitability

Add Age Suitability

There are no age suitabilities for this title yet.

Summary

Add a Summary

There are no summaries for this title yet.

Notices

Add Notices

There are no notices for this title yet.

Quotes

Add a Quote

There are no quotes for this title yet.

Explore Further

Recommendations

Subject Headings

  Loading...

Find it at SPL

  Loading...
[]
[]
To Top