Reflections and Replies

Reflections and Replies

Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge

eBook - 2003
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MIT Press

Tyler Burge has produced groundbreaking work on the semantics of proper names andindexicals, de re belief, formal truth theories, semantic and epistemic paradoxes, the philosophy ofGottlob Frege, and other areas of the philosophy of language and of mind. But he is best known forhis arguments for anti-individualism, or externalism about mental content. Burge's aim in pursuinganti-individualism is nothing less than the solution to some of the most trenchant metaphysical andepistemological problems, including the nature of objectivity and norms, the force of skepticalarguments, apriority, and the nature of the self. Central to all of these is an account ofintentional content that includes a penetrating critique of the empiricist notion of a concept.Thisbook focuses mainly on Burge's work on anti-individualism. In it, various philosophers eithercomment on Burge's work or relate it to their own. An unusual feature is the generosity--both involume and content--of Burge's contribution to this philosophical conversation. The sectioncontaining his responses comprises the most sustained, detailed, and interconnected body of writingthat he has published in one place.


Essays by various philosphers on the work of Tyler Burge and Burge's extensive responses.

Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2003
ISBN: 9780262274715
026227471X
9781423730743
1423730747
Characteristics: 1 online resource (xxix, 504 pages)

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